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Abstract
In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take account
not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as payos), but also
of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. Two dierent but equivalent ways
of dealing with this matter, the semantic and the syntactic, are set forth. Canonical and
universal semantic systems are then dened and constructed, and the concepts of com-
mon knowledge and common priors formulated and characterized. The last two sections
discuss relations with Bayesian games of incomplete information and their applications,
and with interactive epistemology | the theory of multi-agent knowledge and belief as
formulated in mathematical logic.
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Incomplete Information
Robert J. Aumann Aviad Heifetz
1. Introduction
In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take ac-
count not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as
payoﬀs), but also of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. This
chapter sets forth several ways of dealing with this matter, all essentially equiva-
lent.
There are two basic approaches, the syntactic and the semantic; while the
former is conceptually more straightforward, the latter is more prevalent, espe-
cially in game and economic contexts. Each appears in the literature in several
variations.
In the syntactic approach, the beliefs are set forth explicitly: One speciÞes
what each player believes about the substantive matters in question, about the
beliefs of the others about these substantive matters, about the beliefs of the
others about the beliefs of the others about the substantive matters, and so on
ad inÞnitum. This sounds  and is  cumbersome and unwieldy, and from the
beginning of research into the area, a more compact, manageable way was sought
to represent interactive beliefs.
Such a way was found in the semantic approach, which is leaner and less
elaborate, but also less transparent. It consists of a set of states of the world (or
simply states), and for each player and each state, a probability distribution on
the set of all states. We will see that this provides the same information as the
syntactic approach.
The subject of common priors is discussed in Section 9; applications to Game
Theory, in Section 10; and Þnally, Section 11 contains a brief discussion of the
theory from the viewpoint of mathematical logic.
2. The Semantic Approach
Given a set N of players, a (Þnite) semantic belief system consists of
(i) a Þnite set Ω, the state space, whose elements are called states of the world,
or simply states, and whose subsets are called events; and
(ii) for each player i and state ω, a probability distribution πi(·;ω) on Ω; if E
is an event, πi(E;ω) is called is probability for E in ω.
Conceptually, a state of the world is meant to encompass all aspects of
reality that are relevant to the matter under consideration, including the beliefs
of all players in that state. As in probability theory, an event is a set of states;
thus the event it will snow tomorrow is represented by a set of states  those
in which it snows tomorrow.
We assume that
(2.1) if πi({ν};ω) > 0, then πi(E; ν) = πi(E;ω) for all E.
In words: If in state ω, player i considers state ν possible (in the sense of assigning
to it positive probability), then his probabilities for all events are the same in state
ν as in state ω. That is, he does not seriously entertain the possibility that his
own probability for some event E is diﬀerent from what it actually is; he is sure1
of his own probabilities.
The restriction to Þnite systems in this section is for simplicity only; for a
general treatment, see Section 6.
3. An Example
Here N = {Ann,Bob}, Ω = {α,β, γ}, and the probabilities πi({ν};ω) are as
follows:
ν = α β γ
α 1/2 1/2 0
ω = β 1/2 1/2 0
γ 0 0 1
πAnn
ν = α β γ
α 1 0 0
ω = β 0 1/2 1/2
γ 0 1/2 1/2
πBob
1By sure we mean assigns probability 1 to (probabilists use almost sure for this,
but here it would make the text unnecessarily cumbersome and opaque.) Actually, in these
models players know their own probabilities; i.e., they do not admit any possibility, even
with probability 0, of having a diﬀerent probability (see Section 7). Indeed, a persons own
probability judgments would appear to be among the few things of which he can justiÞably be
absolutely certain.
2
In each of the states α and β, Ann attributes probability 1/2 to each of α and
β, whereas in γ, she knows that γ is the state; and Bob, in each of the states β
and γ, attributes probability 1/2 to each of β and γ, whereas in α, he knows that
α is the state.
Now let E = {α, γ}, and let us consider the probabilities of the players in
state β. To start with, each player assigns probability 1/2 to E. At the next
level, each player assigns probability 1/2 to the other assigning probability 1/2
to E, and probability 1/2 to the other being sure2 of E. At the next level, Ann
assigns probability 1/2 to Bob being sure that she assigns probability 1/2 to E;
and probability 1/2 to Bobs assigning probability 1/2 to her being sure of E, and
probability 1/2 to her assigning probability 1/2 to E. The same holds if Ann and
Bob are interchanged. Thats already quite a mouthful; we refrain from describing
the subsequent levels explicitly.
The previous paragraph, with its explicit description of each players proba-
bilities for the other players probabilities, is typical of the syntactic approach.
The complexity of the description increases exponentially with the depth of the
level, and there are inÞnitely many levels. Because this example is particularly
symmetric, the description is relatively simple; in general, things are even more
complex, by far. Note, moreover, that the syntactic treatment corresponds to just
one of the states in the semantic model.
By contrast, the semantic model encapsulates the whole mess, simultaneously
for all the states, in just two compact (3× 3) tables.
4. The Syntactic Approach
The syntactic approach may be formalized by belief hierarchies. One starts with
an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive states of nature (like snow, rain,
cloudy, or clear at noon tomorrow). The Þrst level of the hierarchy speciÞes,
for each player, a probability distribution on the states of nature. The second
level speciÞes, for each player, a joint probability distribution on the states of
nature and the others probability distributions. The third level speciÞes, for each
player, a joint probability distribution on the states of nature and the probability
distributions of the others at the Þrst and second levels. And so on. Certain
2Indeed, Ann assigns 1/2− 1/2 probabilities to the states α and β. In β, Bob assigns prob-
ability 1/2 to E, and in α, Bob is sure of E. This demonstrates our assertion about Anns
probabilities for Bobs probabilities. The calculation of Bobs probabilities for Anns probabili-
ties is similar.
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consistency conditions are required (Mertens and Zamir 1985; see Section 8 below).
Since there is a continuum of possibilities for the probability distributions at
the Þrst level, the probability distributions at the second and higher levels may
well3 be continuous (i.e., have nonatomic components). So one needs some kind
of additional structure  a topology or a measurable structure (σ-Þeld)  on
the space of probability distributions at each level. With Þnitely many states of
nature, this oﬀers no diﬃculty at the Þrst and second levels. But already the third
level consists of a probability distribution on the space of probability distributions
on a continuum, which requires a topology or measurable structure on the space
of probability distributions on a continuum  a nontrivial matter. Of course, this
applies also to higher levels.
An alternative syntactic formalism, which avoids these complications, works
with sentences4 or assertions rather than with probability distributions.5 Start
with a set {x, y, ...} of natural sentences (like rain, warm, and humid at
noon tomorrow), which need be neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. One
may operate on these in two ways: by logical operators and connectives, like not
(¬), or (∨), and and (∧), and by belief operators pαi , whose interpretation
is player i attributes probability at least α to ... . The operations may be
concatenated in any way one wishes; for example, p
1/2
Ann(x∨ p3/4Bob(¬p1/4Anny)) means
that Ann ascribes probability at least 1/2 to the contingency that either x or that
Bob ascribes probability at least 3/4 to her ascribing probability less than 1/4 to
y. A syntactic belief system is a collection of such sentences that satisÞes certain
natural completeness, coherence, and consistency conditions (Section 8).
It may be seen that a syntactic belief system contains precisely the same
substantive information as a belief hierarchy, without the topological or measure-
theoretic complications.
3A discrete distribution would mean, e.g., that Ann knows that Bob assigns probability
precisely 0, 1/2 or 1 to snow. While possible, this seems unlikely. When modelling beliefs about
the beliefs of others, some fuzziness seems natural.
4Usually called formulas in the literature.
5Some workers reserve the term syntactic for this kind of system only  i.e., one using
sentences and syntactic rules. We prefer a more substantive terminology, in which syntactic
refers to any system that directly describes the actual beliefs of the players, whereas semantic
refers to a (states-of-the-world) model from which these beliefs can be derived.
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5. From Semantics to Syntax
We now indicate how the syntactic formalism is derived from the semantic one in
a general framework.
Suppose given a semantic belief system with state space Ω, and a family of
distinguished events X, Y, ... (corresponding6 to the above natural sentences
x, y, ...); such a pair is called an augmented semantic belief system. Let πi(E;ω) be
the probability of player i for event E in state ω. For numbers α between 0 and 1,
let Pαi E be the event that is probability for E is at least α; i.e., the set of all states
ω at which πi(E;ω) ≥ α. Thus the operator Pαi in the semantic model corresponds
to the operator pαi in the syntactic model. As usual, the set operations ∪ (union)
and Ω\ (complementation) correspond to the logical operations ∨ (disjunction)
and ¬ (negation). Thus each sentence in the syntactic formalism corresponds to an
event in the semantic formalism. For example, the sentence p
1/2
Ann(x∨p3/4Bob(¬p1/4Anny))
discussed above corresponds to P
1/2
Ann(X∪P 3/4Bob(Ω\P 1/4AnnY )), namely the event that
Ann ascribes probability at least 1/2 to the event that either X or that Bob
ascribes probability at least 3/4 to her ascribing probability less than 1/4 to Y.
Now Þx a state ω. If e is a sentence and E the corresponding event, say that e
holds in ω if ω is in E. If we think of ω as the true state of the world, then the
true sentences are precisely those that hold in ω. These sentences constitute a
syntactic belief system in the sense of the previous section.
To summarize: Starting from a pair consisting of an augmented semantic belief
system and a state ω, we have constructed a syntactic belief system L. We call
this pair (or just the state ω) a model for L.
6. Removing the Finiteness Restriction
Given a set N of players, a (general) semantic belief system consists of
(ia) a set Ω, the state space, whose elements are the states;
(ib) a σ-Þeld F of subsets of Ω  the events; and
(ii) for each player i and state ω, a probability distribution πi(·;ω) on F .
We assume that
(6.1) πi(E;ω) is F-measurable in ω for each Þxed event E, and
6I.e., with the same conceptual content. Thus if in the syntactic treatment, x is the sentence
it will snow tomorrow, then in the semantic treatment, X is the event it will snow tomorrow
(the set of all states in which it snows tomorrow).
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(6.2) πi({ν : πi(E; ν) 6= πi(E;ω)};ω) = 0 for each event E and state ω.
The interpretation is as in Section 2.
7. Knowledge and Common Knowledge
In the formalism of Sections 2 and 6, the concept of knowledge  in the sense of
absolute certainty7 rather than probability 1  plays no explicit role. However,
this concept can be derived from that formalism. Indeed, for each state ω and
player i, let Ii(ω) be the set of all states in which is probabilities (for all events)
are the same as in ω; call it is information set in ω. The information sets of i
form a partition Pi of Ω, called is information partition. Say that i knows an
event E in a state ω if E includes Ii(ω), and denote by KiE the set of all states
ω in which i knows E. Conceptually, this formulation of knowledge presupposes
that players know their own probabilities with absolute certainty, which is not
unreasonable. It may be seen that
(7.1) KiE ⊂ P 1i E,
i.e., that players ascribe probability 1 to whatever they know, and that
(7.2) P αi E ⊂ KiPαi E,
which formally expresses the principle, enunciated above, that players know their
own probabilities.
Let KE be the set ∩iKiE of all states in which all players know E, and set
K∞E := KE ∩KKE ∩KKKE ∩ ...;
thus K∞E is the set of all states in which all players know E, all players know
that, all players know that, and so on ad inÞnitum. We say that E is commonly
known in ω if ω ∈ K∞E (Lewis 1969); for a comprehensive survey of common
knowledge, see Geanakoplos, this Handbook, Volume 2, Chapter 40. If P∞ is
the meet (Þnest common coarsening) of the information partitions Pi of all the
players i, then it may be seen (Aumann 1976, 1999a) that K∞E is the union of
all the atoms of P∞ that are included in E. The atoms of P∞ are called common
knowledge components (or simply components) of Ω. In a sense, one can always
restrict the discussion to such a component: The true state is always in some
component, and then it is commonly known that it is, and all considerations
relating to other components become irrelevant.
7I.e., with error impossible: If i knows an event E at a state ω, then ω must be in E.
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Some interactive probability formalisms (like Aumann 1999b) use a separate,
exogenous, concept of knowledge, and assume analogues of 7.1 and 7.2 (see 7.3 and
7.4 below). In the semantic framework, such a concept is redundant: Surprisingly,
knowledge is implicit in probability.
To see this, let Pi, Ii, andKi, as above, be the knowledge concepts derived from
the probabilities πi(·;ω), and let Qi, Ji, and Li be the corresponding exogenous
concepts. Assume
(7.3) LiE ⊂ P 1i E (players ascribe probability 1 to what they know8), and
(7.4) P αi E ⊂ LiP αi E (players know their own probabilities).
It suﬃces to show that Ji(ω) = Ii(ω) for all ω. This follows from 7.3 and 7.4; we
argue from the verbal formulations. If ν ∈ Ji(ω), then by 7.4, is probabilities for
all events must be the same in ν and ω, so ν ∈ Ii(ω). Conversely, i knows in ν
that he is in Ji(ν), so by 7.3, his probability for Ji(ν) is 1. So if ν /∈ Ji(ω), then
Ji(ω) and Ji(ν) are disjoint, so in ν his probability for Ji(ω) is 0, while in ω it
is 1. So his probabilities are diﬀerent in ω and ν, so ν /∈ Ii(ω). Thus ν ∈ Ji(ω) if
and only if ν ∈ Ii(ω), as claimed.
8. Canonical Semantic Systems
One may think of a semantic belief system purely technically, simply as providing
the setting for a convenient, compact representation of a syntactic belief system,
as in the example of Section 3. But one may also think of it substantively, as
setting forth a model of interactive epistemology that reßects reality, including
those states of the world that are actually possible,9 and what the players know
about them. This substantive viewpoint raises several questions, foremost among
them being what the players know about the model itself. Does each know the
space of states? Does he know the others probabilities (in each state)? If so,
from where does this knowledge derive? If not, how can the formalism indicate
what each player believes about the others beliefs? For example, why would the
event P
1/2
AnnP
3/4
BobE then signify that Ann ascribes probability at least 1/2 to Bob
ascribing probability at least 3/4 to E?
More generally, the whole idea of state of the world, and of probabilities that
accurately reßect the players beliefs about other players beliefs, is not transpar-
ent. What are the states? Can they be explicitly described? Where do they come
8In the remainder of this section we use know in the exogenous sense.
9Philosophers like the term possible worlds.
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from? Where do the probabilities come from? What justiÞes positing this kind
of model, and what justiÞes a particular array of probabilities?
One way of overcoming these problems is by means of canonical or uni-
versal semantic belief systems. Such a system comprises a standard state space
with standard probabilities for each player in each state. The system does not
depend on reality; it is a framework, it Þts any reality, so to speak, like the frames
that one buys in photo shops, which do not depend on who is in the photo 
they Þt any photo with any subject, as long as the size is right. In brief, there is
no substantive information in the system.
There are basically two ways of doing this. Both depend on two parameters:
the set (or simply number n) of players and the set (or simply number) of nat-
ural eventualities. The Þrst way (Mertens and Zamir 1985) is hierarchical. The
zeroth level of the hierarchy is a (Þnite) set X := {x, y, ...}, whose members rep-
resent mutually exclusive and exhaustive states of nature, but formally are just
abstract symbols. The Þrst level H1 is the cartesian product of X with n copies
of the X-simplex (the set of all probability distributions on X); a point in this
cartesian product describes the true state of nature, and also the probabilities
of each player for each state of nature.
A point h2 at the second level H2 consists of a Þrst-level point h1 together with
an n-tuple of probability distributions on H1, one for each player; this describes
the true state of nature, the probabilities of each player for the state of nature,
and what each player believes about the other players beliefs about the state
of nature. There are two consistency conditions: First, the distribution on
H1 that h2 assigns to i must attribute10 probability 1 to the distribution on X
that h1 assigns to i; that is, i must know what he himself believes. Second, the
distribution11 on X that h2 assigns to i must coincide with the one that h1 assigns
to i.
A third-level point consists of a second-level point h2 together with an n-tuple
of probability distributions12 on H2, one for each player; again, is distribution on
H2 must assign probability 1 to the distribution on H1 that h2 assigns to i, and
its marginal on H1 must coincide with the distribution on H1 that h1 assigns to
10Technically, h2 assigns to i a distribution on H1 = X×∆(X), where ∆ denotes the set of all
distributions on .... The Þrst consistency condition says that the marginal of this distribution
on the second factor (i.e., on ∆(X)) is a unit mass concentrated on the distribution on X that
h1 assigns to i.
11Technically, the marginal on X of the distribution on H1 = X ×∆(X) that h2 assigns to i.
See the previous footnote.
12As indicated in Section 5, this involves topological issues, which we will not discuss.
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i.
And so on. Thus an (m+1)th-level point hm+1 is a pair consisting of an mth-
level point hm and a distribution on Hm; we say that hm+1 elaborates hm. DeÞne
a state h in the canonical semantic belief system H as a sequence h1, h2, ... in
which each term elaborates the previous one. To deÞne the probabilities, proceed
as follows: For each subset Sm of Hm, set bSm = {h ∈ H : hm ∈ Sm}; let F be
the σ-Þeld generated by all the bSm, where Sm is measurable; and let πi(bSm;h)
be the probability that is component of hm+1 assigns to Sm. In words, a state
consists of a sequence of probability distributions of ever-increasing depth; to get
the probability of a set of such sequences in a given state, one simply reads oﬀ the
probabilities speciÞed by that state. That this indeed yields a probability on Fσ
follows from the Kolmogorov extension theorem, which requires some topological
assumptions.13
The second construction (Heifetz and Samet 1998, Aumann 1999b) of a canon-
ical belief system is based on sentences. It uses an alphabet x, y, ..., as well as
more elaborate sentences constructed from the alphabet by means of logical oper-
ations and probability operators pαi (as in Section 4). The letters of the alphabet
represent natural sentences, not necessarily mutually exclusive or exhaustive;
but formally, as above, they are just abstract symbols. In this construction, the
states γ in the canonical space Γ are simply lists of sentences; speciÞcally, lists
that are complete, coherent, and closed in a sense presently to be speciÞed. The
point is that a state is determined  or better, deÞned  by the sentences that
hold there; conceptually, the state is simply what happens.
More precisely: A list is complete if for each sentence f, it contains either f
itself or its negation ¬f ; coherent, if for each f, it does not contain both f and
¬f ; and closed, if it contains every logical consequence14 of the sentences in it.
This deÞnes the states γ in the canonical semantic belief system; to complete
the deÞnition of the system, we must deÞne the σ-Þeld F of events and the
probabilities πi(·; γ). For any sentence f, let Ef := {δ ∈ Γ : f ∈ δ}; that is, Ef
13Without which things might not work (Heifetz and Samet 1998).
14As used here, the term logical consequence is deÞned purely syntactically, by axioms
and inference rules (Meier 2001). But it may be characterized semantically: A sentence g is a
logical consequence of sentences f1, f2, ... if and only if g holds at any state of any augmented
semantic belief system at which f1, f2, ... hold; i.e., if any model for f1, f2, ... is also a model for
g (Meier 2001). The axiomatic system is inÞnitary, as indeed it must be: For example, p1i f is a
logical consequence of p
1/2
i f, p
3/4
i f, p
7/8
i f, ..., but of no Þnite subset thereof. Meiers beautiful,
path-breaking paper is not yet published.
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is the set of all states15 in the canonical system that contain f. We deÞne F as
the σ-Þeld generated by all the events Ef for all sentences f. Then to deÞne is
probabilities on F in the state γ, it suﬃces to deÞne his probabilities for each
Ef . Since the state is simply the list of all sentences that hold in that state, it
follows that Ef is the set of all states in which f holds  in brief, the event that
f holds. The probability that i assigns to Ef in the state γ is then implicit in
the speciÞcation of γ; namely, it is the supremum of all the rational α for which
pαi f is in γ  the supremum α such that in γ, player i assigns probability at least
α to f. This deÞnes πi(Ef ; γ) for each i, γ, and f ; and since the Ef generate F ,
it follows that it deÞnes16 πi(·; γ). This completes the second construction, which
has the advantage of requiring no topological machinery.
The canonical semantic belief system Γ is universal in a sense that we now de-
scribe. Let x, y, ... be letters in an alphabet, and Ω,Ω0 semantic belief systems with
the same players, augmented by distinguished events X, Y, ... and X 0, Y 0, ...,
corresponding to the letters x, y, ... (simply systems for short). A mapping M
from Ω into Ω0 is called a belief morphism if M−1(X 0) = X, M−1(Y 0) = Y, ..., and
πi(M
−1(E0);ω) = π0i(E
0;M(ω)) for all players i, events E0 in Ω0, and states ω in
Ω; i.e., if it preserves the relevant aspects of the system (as usual for morphisms).
A system Υ is called universal if for each system Ω, there is a belief morphism
from Ω into Υ.
To see that Γ is universal, let Ω be a system. Then for each state ω in Ω, the
family D(ω) of sentences that hold in ω (see Section 5) is a state in the canonical
space Γ, and the mapping D : Ω→ Γ is a belief morphism  indeed the only one
(Heifetz and Samet 1998). The construction of Mertens and Zamir (1985) also
leads to a universal system, and the two canonical systems are isomorphic.17
At the end of the previous section, we noted that a separate, exogenous notion
of knowledge is semantically redundant. Syntactically, it is not. To understand
why, consider two two-player semantic belief systems, Ω and Ω0. The Þrst has just
one state ω, to which, of course, both players assign probability 1. The second
has two states, ω and ω0. In ω, both players assign probability 1 to ω; in ω0,
Ann assigns probability 1 to ω, whereas Bob assigns probability 1 to ω0. Now
augment both systems by assigning x to ω. Then the syntactic belief system
15Recall that a state is a list of sentences.
16That is, since the Ef generate F , there cannot be two diﬀerent probability measures on
F with the given values on the Ef . That there is one such measure follows from a theorem of
Caratheodory on extending measures from a Þeld to the σ-Þeld it generates.
17I.e., there is a one-one belief morphism from the one onto the other.
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derived from ω in Ω  the family D(ω) of all sentences that hold there  is
identical to that derived from ω in Ω0. So syntactically, the two situations are
indistinguishable. But semantically, they are diﬀerent: In Ω, Ann knows for sure
in ω that Bob assigns probability 1 to x; in Ω0, she does not. There is no way to
capture this syntactically without explicitly introducing knowledge operators ki
for the various players i (as in Aumann 1999b; see also 1998). In particular, the
canonical semantic system Γ has just one component18  the whole space.
9. Common Priors
Call a semantic belief system regular19 if it is Þnite, has a single common knowledge
component, and in each state, each player assigns positive probability to that
state. A common prior on a regular semantic belief system Ω is deÞned as a
probability distribution π on Ω such that
(9.1) π(E ∩ Ii(ω)) = πi(E;ω)π(Ii(ω))
for each event E, player i, and state ω; that is, the personal probabilities πi in a
state ω are obtained from the common prior π by conditioning on each players
private information in that state. In Section 3, for example, the distribution that
assigns probability 1/3 to each of the three states is the unique common prior.
Common priors can easily fail to exist; for example, if Ω has just two states, in
each of which Ann assigns 1/2 - 1/2 probabilities to the two states, and Bob,
1/3 - 2/3 probabilities. Conceptually, existence of a common prior signiÞes that
diﬀerences in probability assessments are due to diﬀerences in information only
(Aumann 1987, 1998); that people who have always been fed precisely the same
information will not diﬀer in their probability assessments.
With a common prior, players cannot agree to disagree about probabilities.
That is, if it is commonly known in some state that for some speciÞc α,β, and
E, Ann and Bob assign probabilities α and β respectively to the event E, then
α = β. This is the Agreement Theorem (Aumann 1976).
The question arises (Gul 1998) whether the existence of a common prior can
be characterized syntactically. That is, can one characterize those syntactic belief
18Except when there is only one player. This is because the probability syntax can only
express beliefs of the players, not that a player knows anything about another one for sure.
19Regularity enables uncluttered statements of the deÞnitions and results. No real loss of
generality is involved.
11
systems L that are associated with common priors?20 By a syntactic characteri-
zation, we mean one couched directly in terms of the sentences in L.
The answer is yes. Indeed, there are two totally diﬀerent characterizations.
The Þrst is based on the following, which is both a generalization of and a converse
to the agreement theorem.
Proposition 9.2 (Morris 1994, Samet21 1998b, Feinberg 2000).22 Let Ω be a
regular semantic belief system, ω a state in Ω. Suppose Þrst that there are just
two players, Ann and Bob. Then there is no common prior on Ω if and only if
there is a random variable23 x for which it is commonly known in ω that Anns
expectation of x is positive and Bobs is negative.24
With n players, there is no common prior on Ω if and only if there are n
random variables xi identically
25 summing to 0 for whom it is commonly known
in ω that each player is expectation of xi is positive.
In the two-person case, one may think of x as the amount of a bet between Ann
and Bob, possibly with odds that depend on the outcome. Thus the proposition
says that with a common prior, it is impossible for both players to expect to gain
from such a bet. The interpretation in the n-person case is similar; one may think
of pari-mutuel betting in horse-racing, the track being one of the players.
In brief, common priors exist if and only if it is commonly known that you cant
make something out of nothing: I.e., in a situation that is objectively zero-sum,
it cannot be commonly known that all sides expect to gain.
The importance of this proposition lies in that it is formulated in terms of
one single state ω only. We are talking about what Ann expects in that state,
what she thinks in that state that Bob may expect, what she thinks in that state
that Bob thinks that she may expect, and so on; and similarly for Bob. That is
precisely what is needed for a syntactic characterization.26
20More precisely, those L for which there is a state ω in some Þnite augmented semantic belief
system with a common prior such that L is the collection of sentences holding at ω.
21Samets proof, which uses the elementary theory of convex polyhedra, is the briefest and
most elegant.
22For an early related result, see Nau and McCardle (1990).
23A real function on Ω. Although the concept of random variable may seem essentially seman-
tic, it is not; in an augmented semantic system, random variables can in general be expressed
in terms of sentences (Feinberg 2000, Heifetz 2001).
24Explicitly, the commonly known event in question is
{ν :Pξ∈Ω πAnn({ξ}; ν)x(ξ) > 0 >Pξ∈Ω πBob({ξ}; ν)x(ξ)}.
25At each state in Ω.
26Recall that we use the term syntactic rather broadly, as referring to anything that actually
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Actually to derive a fully syntactic characterization from this proposition is,
however, a diﬀerent matter. To do so, one must provide syntactic formulations
of (i) common knowledge, (ii) random variables and their expectations, and (iii)
Þniteness of the state space. The Þrst is not diﬃcult; setting k := ∧iki, call a
sentence e syntactically commonly known if e, ke, kke, kkke, ... all obtain. But (ii)
and (iii), though doable  indeed elegantly (Feinberg 2000, Heifetz 2001)  are
more involved; we will not discuss the matter further here.
Proposition 9.2 holds also for inÞnite state spaces that are compact in a
natural sense. As before, this enables a syntactic characterization in the compact
case; to do this properly one must characterize compactness syntactically. With-
out compactness, the proposition fails. Feinberg (2000) discusses these matters
fully.
The second syntactic characterization of common priors is in terms of iterated
expectations. Again, consider Þrst the two-person case. If ν is a state and y a
random variable, then Anns and Bobs expectations of y in ν are
(EAnny)(ν) :=
P
ξ∈Ω πAnn({ξ}; ν)y(ξ) and
(EBoby)(ν) :=
P
ξ∈Ω πBob({ξ}; ν)y(ξ).
Both EAnny and EBoby are themselves random variables, as they are functions of
the state ν. So one may form the iterated expectations
(9.3) EAnny,EBobEAnny,EAnnEBobEAnny,EBobEAnnEBobEAnny,... and
(9.4) EBoby,EAnnEBoby,EBobEAnnEBoby,EAnnEBobEAnnEBoby,... .
Proposition 9.5 (Samet 1998a). Each of these two sequences (9.3 and 9.4) of
random variables converges to a constant (independent of the state); the system
has a common prior if and only if for each random variable y, these two constants
coincide; and in that case, the common value of the two constants is the expecta-
tion of y over Ω w.r.t. the common prior π.
The proof uses Þnite state Markov chains.
Samet illustrates the proposition with a story about two stock analysts. Ann
has an expectation for the price y of IBM in one month from today. Bob does not
know Anns expectation, but has some idea of what it might be; his expectation
of her expectation is EBobEAnny. And so on.
Like the previous characterization of common priors (Proposition 9.2), this
one appears semantic, but in fact is syntactic: All the iterated expectations can
be read oﬀ from a single syntactic belief system. As before, actually deriving a
obtains, such as the beliefs  and hence expectations  of the players. See Footnote 5.
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fully syntactic characterization requires formulating Þniteness of the state space
syntactically, which we do not do here. Unlike the previous characterization, this
one has not been established for compact state spaces.
With n players, one considers arbitrary inÞnite sequences Ei1y,Ei2Ei1y,
Ei3Ei2Ei1y,Ei4Ei3Ei2Ei1y,..., where i1, i2, ... is any sequence of players (with rep-
etitions, of course), the only requirement being that each player appears in the
sequence inÞnitely often. The result says that each such sequence converges to a
constant; the system has a common prior if and only if all the constants coincide;
and in that case, the common value of the constants is the expectation of y over
Ω w.r.t. the common prior π.
10. Incomplete Information Games
The theory of incomplete information, whose general, abstract form is outlined in
the foregoing sections of this chapter, has historical roots in a concrete application:
games. Until the mid-sixties, game theorists did not think carefully about the
informational underpinnings of their analyses. Luce and Raiﬀa (1957) did express
some malaise on this score, but left the matter at that. The primary problem was
each players uncertainty about the payoﬀ (or utility) functions of the others; to
a lesser extent, there was also concern about the players uncertainty about the
strategies available to others, and about their own payoﬀs.
In path-breaking research in the mid-sixties, for which he got the Nobel Prize
some thirty years later, John Harsanyi (1967-8) succeeded both in formulating
the problem precisely, and in solving it. In brief, the formulation is the syntactic
approach, whereas the solution is the semantic approach. Let us elaborate.
Harsanyi started by noting that though usually the players do not know the
others payoﬀ functions, nevertheless, as good Bayesians, each has a (subjective)
probability distribution over the possible payoﬀ functions of the others. But that
is not enough to analyze the situation. Each player must also take into account
what the others think that he thinks about them. Even there it does not end;
he must also take into account what the others think that he thinks that they
think about him. And so on, ad inÞnitum. Harsanyi saw this inÞnite regress as a
Gordian knot, not given to coherent, useful analysis.
To cut the knot, Harsanyi invented the notion of type. Consider the case
of two players, Ann and Bob. Each player, he said, may be one of several types.
The type of a player determines his payoﬀ function, and also a probability dis-
tribution on the other players possible types. Since Bobs type determines his
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payoﬀ function, Anns probability distribution on his types induces a probability
distribution on his payoﬀ functions. But it also induces a probability distribution
on his probability distributions on Anns types, and so on Anns payoﬀ functions.
And so on. Thus a type structure yields the whole inÞnite regress of payoﬀ func-
tions, distributions on payoﬀ functions, distributions on distributions on payoﬀ
functions, and so on.
The reader will realize that the inÞnite regress is a syntactic belief hierarchy
in the sense of Section 6, the states of nature being n-tuples of payoﬀ functions;
whereas a type structure is a semantic belief system, the states of the world
being n-tuples of types. In modern terms, Harsanyis insight was that a semantic
system yields a syntactic system. Though this may seem obvious today (see
Section 3), it was far from obvious at the time; indeed it was a major conceptual
breakthrough, which enabled extending many of the fundamental concepts of
game theory to the incomplete information case, and led to the opening of entirely
new areas of research (see below).
The converse  that every syntactic system can be encapsulated in a semantic
system  was not proved by Harsanyi. Harsanyi argued for the type structure
on intuitive grounds. Roughly speaking, he reasoned that every players brain
must be conÞgured in some way, and that this conÞguration should determine
both the players utility or payoﬀ function and his probability distribution on the
conÞguration of other players brains.
The proof that indeed every syntactic system can be encapsulated in a se-
mantic system is outlined in Section 8 above; the semantic system in question is
simply the canonical one. This proof was developed over a number of years by
several workers (Armbruster and Bo¨ge 1979, Bo¨ge and Eisele 1979), culminating
in the work of Mertens and Zamir (1985) cited in Section 8 above.
Also the assumption of common priors (Section 9) was introduced by Harsanyi
(1967-8), who called this the consistent case. He pointed out that in this case 
and only in this case  an n-person game of incomplete information in strategic
(i.e., normal) form can be represented by an n-person game of complete infor-
mation in extensive form, as follows: First, chance chooses an n-tuple of types
(i.e., a state of the world), using the common prior π for probabilities. Then, each
player is informed of his type, but not of the others types. Then the n players
simultaneously choose strategies. Finally, payoﬀs are made in accordance with
the types chosen by nature and the strategies chosen by the players.
The concept of strategic (Nash) equilibrium generalizes to incomplete infor-
mation games in a natural way. Such an equilibrium  often called a Bayesian
15
Nash equilibrium  assigns to each type ti of each player i a (mixed or pure)
strategy of i that is optimal for i given tis assessment of the probabilities of the
others types and the strategies that the equilibrium assigns to those types. In the
consistent (common prior) case, the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the incomplete
information strategic game are precisely the same as the ordinary Nash equilibria
of the associated complete information extensive game (described in the previous
paragraph).
Since Harsanyis seminal work, the theory of incomplete information games has
been widely developed and applied. Several areas of application are of particular
interest. Repeated games of incomplete information deal with situations where the
same game is played again and again, but the players have only partial information
as to what it is. This is delicate because by taking advantage of his private
information, a player may implicitly reveal it, possibly to his detriment. For
surveys up to 1991, see this Handbook, Volume I, Chapter 5 (Zamir) and Chapter
6 (Forges). Since 1992, the literature on this subject has continued to grow; see
Aumann and Maschler (1995), whose bibliography is fairly complete up to 1994.
A more complete and modern treatment,27 unfortunately as yet unpublished, is
Mertens, Sorin, and Zamir (1994).
Other important areas of application include auctions (see Wilson, this
Handbook, Volume I, Chapter 8), bargaining with incomplete information (Bin-
more, Osborne, and Rubinstein I,7 and Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere III,50),
principal-agent problems (Dutta and Radner II,26), inspection (Avenhaus, von
Stengel, and Zamir III,51), communication and signalling (Myerson II,24 and
Kreps and Sobel II,25), and entry deterrence (Wilson I,10).
Not surveyed in this Handbook are coalitional (cooperative) games of incom-
plete information. Initiated by Wilson (1978) and Myerson (1984), this area is to
this day fraught with unresolved conceptual diﬃculties. Allen (1997) and Forges,
Minelli, and Vohra (2001) are surveys.
Finally, games of incomplete information are useful in understanding games
of complete information  ordinary, garden-variety games. Here the applications
are of two kinds. In one, the given complete information game is perturbed
by adding some small element of incomplete information. For example, Harsanyi
(1973) uses this technique to address the question of the signiÞcance of mixed
strategies: Why would a player wish to randomize, in view of the fact that when-
ever a mixed strategy µ is optimal, it is also optimal to use any pure strategy
in the support of µ? His answer is that indeed players never actually use mixed
27Including also the general theory of incomplete information covered in this chapter.
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strategies. Rather, even in a complete information game, the payoﬀs should be
thought of as commonly known only approximately. In fact, there are small vari-
ations in the payoﬀ to each player that are known only to that player himself;
these small variations determine which pure strategy s in the support of µ he
actually plays. It turns out that the probability with which a given pure strategy
s is actually played in this scenario approximates the coeﬃcient of s in µ. Thus,
a mixed strategy of a player i appears not as a deliberate randomization on is
part, but as representing the estimate of other players as to what i will do.
Another application of this kind comes under the heading of reputational ef-
fects. Seminal in this genre was the work of the gang of four (Kreps, Milgrom,
Roberts, and Wilson 1982), in which a repeated prisoners dilemma is perturbed
by assuming that with some arbitrarily small exogenous probability, the play-
ers are irrational automata who always play tit-for-tat. It turns out that in
equilibrium, the irrationality takes over in some sense: Almost until the end of
the game, the rational players themselves play tit-for-tat. Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986) generalize this to irrational strategies other than tit-for-tat; as before,
equilibrium play mimics the irrational perturbation, even when (unlike tit-for-tat)
it is ineﬃcient. Aumann and Sorin (1989) allow any perturbation with bounded
recall; in this case equilibrium play automatically selects an eﬃcient equilib-
rium.
The second kind of application of incomplete information technology to com-
plete information games is where the object of incomplete information is not the
payoﬀs of the players but the actual strategies they use. For example, rather
than perturbing payoﬀs a la Harsanyi (1973  see above), one can say that even
without perturbed payoﬀs, players other than i simply do not know what pure
strategy i will play; is mixed strategy represents the probabilities of the other
players as to what i will do. Works of this kind include Aumann (1987), in which
correlated equilibrium in a complete information game is characterized in terms
of common priors and common knowledge of rationality; and Aumann and Bran-
denburger (1995), in which Nash equilibrium in a complete information game is
characterized in terms of mutual knowledge of rationality and of the strategies be-
ing played, and when there are more than two players, also of common priors and
common knowledge of the strategies being played (for a more detailed account,
see Hillas and Kohlberg, this Handbook, Volume III, Chapter 42).
The key to all these applications is Harsanyis type deÞnition  the seman-
tic representation  without which building a workable model for applications
would be hopeless.
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11. Interactive Epistemology
Historically, the theory of incomplete information outlined in this chapter has two
parents: (i) incomplete information games, discussed in the previous section, and
(ii) that part of mathematical logic, sometimes called modal logic, that treats
knowledge and other epistemological issues, which we now discuss. In turn, (ii)
itself has various ancestors. One is probability theory, in which the sample space
(or probability space) and its measurable subsets (there, like here, events)
play a role much like that of the space Ω of states of the world; whereas subÞelds
of measurable sets, as in stochastic processes, play a role much like that of our
information partitions Pi (Section 7). Another ancestor is the theory of extensive
games, originated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), whose information
sets are closely related to our information sets Ii(ω) (Section 7).
Formal epistemology, in the tradition of mathematical logic, began some forty
years ago, with the work of Kripke (1959) and Hintikka (1962); these works were
set in a single-person context. Lewis (1969) was the Þrst to deÞne common knowl-
edge, which of course is a multi-person, interactive concept; though verbal, his
treatment was entirely rigorous. Computer scientists became interested in the
area in the mid-eighties; see Fagin et al. (1995).
Most work in formal epistemology concerns knowledge (Section 7) rather than
probability. Though the two have much in common, knowledge is more elemen-
tary, in a sense that will be explained presently. Both interactive knowledge and
interactive probability can be formalized in two ways: semantically, by a states-
of-the-world model, or syntactically, either by a hierarchic model or by a formal
language with sentences and logical inference governed by axioms and inference
rules. The diﬀerence lies in the nature of logical inference. In the case of knowl-
edge, sentences, axioms, and inference rules are all Þnitary (Fagin et al. 1995;
Aumann 1999a). But probability is essentially inÞnitary (Footnote 14); there is
no Þnitary syntactic model for probability.
Nevertheless, probability does have a Þnitary aspect. Heifetz and Mongin
(2001) show that there is a Þnitary system A of axioms and inference rules such
that if f and g are Þnitary probability sentences then g is a logical consequence28
of f if and only if it is derivable from f via the Þnitary system A. That is, though
in general the notion of logical consequence is inÞnitary, for Þnitary sentences
it can be embodied in a Þnitary framework.
Finally, we mention the matter of backward induction in perfect information
28In the inÞnitary sense of Meier (2001) discussed in Section 8 (Footnote 14).
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games, which has been the subject of intense epistemic study, some of it based
on probability 1 belief. This is a separate area, which should have been covered
elsewhere in the Handbook, but is not.
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Appendix: Limitations of the Syntactic
Approach
Aviad Heifetz
The interpretation of the universal model of Section 8 as canonical, with
the association of beliefs to states self-evident by virtue of the states inner
structure, relies nevertheless on the non-trivial assumption that the players beliefs
cannot be but σ-additive. This is highlighted by the following example.
In the Mertens-Zamir (1985) construction mentioned in Section 8, we shall
focus our attention on a subspace Ω whose states ω can be represented in the
form
ω = (s, i1i2i3 . . . , j1j2j3 . . .)
where each digit s, ik, jk may assume the value 0 or 1. The state of nature is
s. The sequences i1i2i3 . . . , j1j2j3 . . . encode the beliefs of the players i and j,
respectively, in the following way. If the sequence starts with 1, the player assigns
probability 1 to the true state of nature s in ω. Otherwise, if her sequence starts
with 0, she assigns probabilities half-half to the two possible states of nature.
Inductively, suppose we have already described the beliefs of the players up to
level n. If in+1 = 1, i believes with probability 1 that the n-th digit of j equals
the actual value of jn in ω, and otherwise  if in+1 = 0  she assigns equal
probabilities to each of the possible values of this digit, 0 or 1. This belief of
i is independent of is lower-level beliefs. In addition, i assigns probability 1 to
her own lower-level beliefs. The n+ 1-th level of belief of individual j is deÞned
symmetrically.
Notice that up to every Þnite level n there are Þnitely many events to consider,
so the beliefs are trivially σ-additive. Therefore, by the Kolmogorov extension
theorem, for the hierarchy of beliefs of every sequence, there is a unique σ-additive
coherent extension to a probability measure29 over Ω. When in = 0 for all n, the
strong law of large numbers asserts that this limit extension assigns probability 1
to the sequences of j where
lim
n→∞
j1 + j2 + . . . jn
n
=
1
2
.
29With the σ-Þeld generated by the events that depend on Þnitely many digits.
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However, there are Þnitely additive coherent extensions to is Þnite level beliefs
that are concentrated on the disjoint set of js sequences where
lim inf
n→∞
j1 + j2 + . . . jn
n
>
1
2
(A.1)
and in fact there are Þnitely additive coherent extensions concentrated on any tail
event of sequences j1j2j3 . . . , i.e., an event where every possible initial segment
j1 . . . jn appears in some sequence.
30
Thus, though the Þnite-level beliefs single out unique σ-additive limit beliefs
over Ω, nothing in them can specify that these limit beliefs must be σ-additive. If
Þnitely additive beliefs are not ruled out in the players minds, we cannot assume
that the inner structure of the states ω ∈ Ω speciÞes uniquely the beliefs of the
players.
A similar problem presents itself if we restrict our attention to knowledge. In
the syntactic formalism of Section 4, replace the belief operators pαi with knowl-
30To see this, observe that to any event deÞned by k out of js digits, the sequence
i1i2i3 . . . = 000 . . . (A.2)
assigns the probability 2−k. Therefore, the integral I w.r.t. this belief is well deÞned over the
vector space V of real-valued functions which are each measurable w.r.t. Þnitely many of js
digits. Now, for every real-valued function g on js sequences, deÞne the functional
I(g) = inf{I(f) : f ∈ V, g ≤ f}.
Then I is clearly sub-additive, I(αg) = αI(g) for α ≥ 0, and I = I on V. Therefore, by the
Hahn-Banach theorem, there is an extension (in fact, many extensions) of I as a positive linear
functional to the limits of sequences of functions in V, and further to all the real-valued functions
on Ω, satisfying
I(g) ≤ I(g).
Restricting our attention to characteristic functions g, we thus get a Þnitely additive coherent
extension of (A.2) over Ω.
The proof of the Hahn-Banach theorem proceeds by consecutively considering functions g to
which I is not yet extended, and deÞning
I(g) = I(g).
If the Þrst function g1 to which I is extended is a characteristic function of a tail event (like
A.1), the smallest f ∈ F majorizing g1 is the constant function f ≡ 1, so
I(g) = I(1) = 1,
and the resulting coherent extension of (A.2) assigns probability 1 to the chosen tail event.
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edge operators ki.When associating sentences to states of an augmented semantic
belief system in Section 5, say that the sentence kie holds in state ω if ω ∈ KiE, 31
where E is the event that corresponds to the sentence e. The canonical knowledge
system Γ will now consist of those lists of sentences that hold in some state of
some augmented semantic belief system. The information set Ii(γ) of player i at
the list γ ∈ Γ will consist of all the lists γ0 ∈ Γ that contain exactly the same
sentences of the form kif as in γ. It now follows that
kif ∈ γ ⇔ γ ∈ KiEf (A.3)
where Ef ⊆ Γ is the event that f holds,32 and the knowledge operator Ki is as in
Section 7: KiE = {γ ∈ Γ : Ii(γ) ⊆ E}.
However, there are many alternative deÞnitions for the information sets Ii(γ)
for which (A.3) would still obtain.33 Thus, by no means can we say that the
information sets Ii(γ) are self-evident from the inner structure of the lists γ
which constitute the canonical knowledge system.
To see this, consider the following example (similar to that in Fagin et al.
1991). Ana, Bjorn and Christina participate in a computer forum over the web.
At some point Ana invites Bjorn to meet the next evening. At that stage they
leave the forum to continue the chat in private. If they eventually exchange n
messages back and forth regarding the meeting, there is mutual knowledge of
level n between them that they will meet, but not common knowledge, which
they could attain, say, by eventually talking over the phone.
Christina doesnt know how many messages were eventually exchanged be-
tween Ana and Bjorn, so she does not exclude any Þnite level of mutual knowledge
between them about the meeting. Nevertheless, Christina could still rule out the
possibility of common knowledge (say, if she could peep into Bjorns room and see
that he was glued to his computer the whole day and spoke with nobody). But if
this situation is formalized by a list of sentences γ, Christina does not exclude the
possibility of common knowledge between Ana and Bjorn with the above deÞnition
of IChristina(γ). This is because there exists an augmented belief system Ω with
a state ω0 in which there is common knowledge between Ana and Bjorn, while
Christina does not exclude any Þnite level of mutual knowledge between them,
exactly as in the situation above. We then have γ0 ∈ IChristina(γ), where γ0 is the
list of sentences that hold in ω0. Thus, if we redeÞne IChristina(γ) by omitting γ0
31The semantic knowledge operator KiE is deÞned in Section 7.
32As in Section 8.
33In fact, as many as there are subsets of Γ! (Heifetz 1999.)
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from it, (A.3) would still obtain, because (A.3) refers only to sentences or events
that describe Þnite levels of mutual knowledge.
At Þrst it may seem that this problem can be mitigated by enriching the syntax
with a common knowledge operator (for every subgroup of two or more players).
Such an operator would be shorthand for the inÞnite conjunction everybody (in
the subgroup) knows, and everybody knows that everybody knows, and.... This
would settle things in the above example, but create numerous new, analogous
problems. The discontinuity of knowledge is essential: The same phenomena
persist (i.e., (A.3) does not pin down the information sets Ii(γ)) even if the syntax
explicitly allows for inÞnite conjunctions and disjunctions of sentences of whatever
chosen cardinality (Heifetz 1994).
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